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Abstract Richardson et al. (Sci Bull, 2015. doi:10.1007/
s11434-015-0806-z) suggest that the irreducibly simple
climate model described in Monckton of Brenchley et al.
(Sci Bull 60:122–135, 2015. doi:10.1007/s11434-014-
0699-2) was not validated against observations, relying
instead on synthetic test data based on underestimated
global warming, illogical parameter choice and near-in-
stantaneous response at odds with ocean warming and other
observations. However, the simple model, informed by its
authors’ choice of parameters, usually hindcasts observed
temperature change more closely than the general-circu-
lation models, and finds high climate sensitivity implausi-
ble. With IPCC’s choice of parameters, the model is further
validated in that it duly replicates IPCC’s sensitivity
interval. Also, fast climate system response is consistent
with near-zero or net-negative temperature feedback.
Given the large uncertainties in the initial conditions and
evolutionary processes determinative of climate sensitivity,
subject to obvious caveats a simple sensitivity-focused
model need not, and the present model does not, exhibit
significantly less predictive skill than the general-circula-
tion models.
Keywords Climate change  Climate sensitivity 
Climate models  Global warming  Temperature
feedbacks
1 Introduction
1.1 Defects in complex models’ output
Outputs from the general-circulation models cited in
IPCC’s five Assessment Reports FAR, SAR, TAR, AR4
and AR5 [1–5] were examined in [6] using a simple model
calibrated against IPCC’s central climate-sensitivity esti-
mates in AR4-5 and were found to overestimate observed
air temperature trends. Reasons for this hot running were
discussed. The simple model, using parameter values
consistent with a growing body of papers [e.g., 7–33] that
report climate sensitivity to be below current central esti-
mates, showed that in at least five significant respects the
general-circulation models’ approach was questionable:
(1) The assumption that temperature feedbacks will
double or triple direct warming is unsound. Feed-
backs may well reduce warming, not amplify it (see,
e.g., [16, 19]).
(2) The Bode system-gain equation models mutual
amplification of feedbacks in electronic circuits, but,
when models erroneously apply it to the essentially
thermostatic climate on the assumption of strongly
net-amplifying feedbacks, its use leads to substantial
overestimation of global warming.
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(3) Climate modelers have failed to cut their central
estimate of global warming in line with a new, lower
estimate of the feedback sum (AR5, fig. 9.43). They
still predict 3.3 K warming per CO2 doubling, when
on this ground alone they should only predict 2.2 K,
of which direct warming and feedbacks each con-
tribute about 50 %.
(4) Though general-circulation models suggest 0.6 K
man-made warming is ‘‘in the pipeline’’ even if
CO2 emissions cease, the simple model, supported by
almost two decades without significant global warm-
ing [34], suggests there is no committed but unreal-
ized man-made warming still to come.
(5) AR5’s extreme RCP 8.5 forcing scenario predicting
*12 K anthropogenic warming is unjustifiable. It was
based on CO2 concentration growing at
5.5 ppmv year-1 this century, though AR4’s central
estimate was below 3.5 ppmv year-1 and the current
growth rate [35] is little more than 2 ppmv year-1.
In [6], it was concluded that once due allowance is made
for these and other shortcomings in the general-circulation
models, the likely global warming in response to a dou-
bling of CO2 concentration is not 3.3 K but 1 K or less and
that even if all available fossil fuels are combusted\2.2 K
warming will result.
1.2 The simple model
The irreducibly simple model presented in [6], encapsu-
lated in (1), determines the surface temperature response
DTt to anthropogenic radiative forcings and consequent
temperature feedbacks over any given period of years t:
DTt ¼ q1t DFtrtk1














rtk0 1  gð Þ1




rtk0 1  k0ftð Þ1;
ð1Þ
where qt is the fraction of total anthropogenic forcing
represented by CO2 over t years, and its reciprocal allows
for non-CO2 forcings as well as the CO2 forcing; DFt is the
radiative forcing in response to a change in atmospheric
CO2 concentration over t years, which is the product of a
constant k and the proportionate change (Ct / C0) in CO2
concentration over the period, where C0 is the unperturbed
concentration ([36]; TAR, ch. 6.1); rt is the transience
fraction, which is the fraction of equilibrium sensitivity
expected to be attained over t years, allowing any delayed-
response profile to be modeled as a time series; k? is the
equilibrium climate-sensitivity parameter, which is the
product of the Planck or zero-feedback sensitivity param-
eter k0 (AR4, p. 631 fn.) and the open-loop or system gain
G, which is itself the reciprocal of 1 minus the closed-loop
gain g, which is in turn the product of k0 and the sum ft of
all temperature feedbacks acting over the period.
In [6], the simple model encapsulated in (1) is described
thus: ‘‘This simple equation represents, in an elementary
but revealing fashion, the essential determinants of the
temperature response to any anthropogenic radiative per-
turbation of the climate, and permits even the non-spe-
cialist to generate respectable approximate estimates of
temperature response over time. It is not, of course,
intended to replace the far more complex general-circula-
tion models: rather, it is intended to illuminate them.’’
2 Criticisms of the simple model
In [37], various criticisms of the simple model in [6] were
tendered. We now consider those criticisms seriatim.
2.1 Form of the simple model
It is stated in [37] that the simple model’s ‘‘extreme sim-
plification necessarily leaves out many physical pro-
cesses’’. The model was intentionally simple. The aim was
to allow even an undergraduate student of climatological
physics to understand the key forcings, feedbacks and other
parameters determinative of climate sensitivity and to
generate respectable climate-sensitivity estimates that
would serve to illuminate the outputs of the general-cir-
culation models. General-circulation models are inherently
complex, so that processes and feedbacks are often
obscured. The goal of the simple model is to be transparent
and to allow for direct evaluation of the response function
associated with its key components. Indeed, so large are the
uncertainties in the initial conditions and in the time-de-
pendent processes by which the climate object evolves that
the penalty in predictive skill arising from simplicity is
smaller than might otherwise be the case. Every model is a
simplification, and every simplification is an analogy, and
every analogy breaks down at some point. Accordingly, [6]
contained caveats about the limitations on the competence
of a simple model.
2.2 Focus on anthropogenic forcings
It is said in [37] that ‘‘the standard approach’’ that includes
natural as well as anthropogenic forcings ‘‘is more useful’’
than the simple model ‘‘because both DTt and DFt may be
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estimated from observations’’. However, attribution as
between anthropogenic and natural temperature change is not
trivial. Also, uniform near-global-temperature measurements
only became available in 1979 with the two satellite lower-
troposphere datasets. Uncertainties before that time do not
provide a secure basis for attempting to determine climate
sensitivity. Also, as [6] explained, the process of determining
forcings and distinguishing them from feedbacks is subject to
very large uncertainties. Even the usual central estimate of the
CO2 forcing was reduced by 15 % on the basis of intercom-
parison between three models in [36]. In any event, the user of
the simple model may incorporate terms for natural forcings
where that is thought desirable.
2.3 The transience fraction
It is argued in [37] that the transience fraction rt should
have been determined not by reference to a single pulse of
forcing but by a convolution of the forcing series with the
time-response function. Naturally, one could have pre-
sented a more complex model. However, the effect of
assuming a single pulse rather than a time series of forcings
is merely to increase the value of rt somewhat, for the sake
of caution, where t is sufficiently distant both from zero
and from equilibrium. At equilibrium, the primary focus of
[6], rt is by definition unity. Likewise, if the feedback sum
ft is below 0.1, no large error arises from assuming rt = 1.
And it is made clear in [6] that the user is free to adopt any
chosen time-series array of values for rt. Finally, the
authors of [37] have not performed the calculation they had
themselves recommended.
2.4 Calibration of the simple model
It is stated in [37] that the projections of the simple model
were not compared with observations. However, as
explained in [6] and confirmed in [37], the model was
calibrated against the central climate-sensitivity projections
in AR4-5 and was found to reproduce those projections. In
[6], parameter values somewhat different from IPCC’s
values were then selected, assuming net-negative feed-
backs and also assuming a transience fraction rt = 1. The
model was then run, determining a climate sensitivity of
1.0 [0.8, 1.3] K per CO2 doubling, in response to a CO2
radiative forcing 5.35 ln(2) = 3.7 W m-2.
The parameter values that generated this climate-sensi-
tivity interval had not been fitted to past observations, since
the intention was to base them purely on objective, theo-
retical considerations. Using those parameters, and with the
aim of responding constructively to the suggestion that
comparison with observation would be of value, the model
has now been tested against observation. Some preliminary
considerations should be borne in mind.
First, the still problematic tendency of the global-tem-
perature datasets to overestimate the amplitude of anthro-
pogenic warming over the past 150–250 years owing to
contributions from non-climatic factors [38, 39] has been
largely set to one side in the analysis that follows.
Worse, we do not really know—perhaps even to within
a factor 2—what is the magnitude of the total forcings
since 1750. IPCC ([1], p. xxiv) provided a graph predicting
future annual emissions of CO2 (Fig. 1). Scenario A, the
‘‘business-as-usual’’ case, predicted global emissions of
almost 10 GtC year-1 by 2012. In [40], it was estimated
that in 2013 global emissions were actually 10.8 GtC,
somewhat above even the business-as-usual prediction in
FAR. Scenario A, then, is closer than the other three FAR
scenarios to the observed outturn.
Why the factor-2 difference between the forcings of
4 W m-2 predicted in FAR (Fig. 2) and the estimated out-
turn of little more than half of that value, or 2.3 W m-2, in
AR5 (Fig. SPM.5)? The chief reason is that from SAR
Fig. 1 Predicted annual CO2 emissions (GtC) on four scenarios
(FAR, p. xxiv) and 2012 outturn
Fig. 2 Projected business-as-usual radiative forcings, 1990–2100
versus 1765 (FAR, Fig. 2.4 box 1)
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onward IPCC introduced the notion that anthropogenic
aerosol forcings were pronouncedly negative.
The literature, however, is divided on this subject. For
instance, a recent paper [41] modeling climate sensitivity
based on research showing that a strong aerosol forcing
establishes itself early in the historical record finds sensi-
tivity tightly constrained close to 1.3 K (Fig. 3). Bearing in
mind these and other uncertainties, a number of observa-
tional test runs of the model were performed.
2.4.1 Observational test 1
One method of testing the simple model’s predictive skill is
to compare its prediction of global warming in the 25 years
1990–2014 with those made by the IPCC on the business-
as-usual Scenario A from 1990 to 2025 and also with
observed outturn. The IPCC’s predictions (FAR, executive
summary) were presented under the heading ‘‘How much
confidence do we have in our predictions?’’ IPCC pointed
out some uncertainties (clouds, oceans, etc.), but
concluded:
Nevertheless … we have substantial confidence that
models can predict at least the broad-scale features of
climate change … There are similarities between
results from the coupled models using simple
representations of the ocean and those using more
sophisticated descriptions, and our understanding of
such differences as do occur gives us some confi-
dence in the results.
FAR’s medium-term temperature-change prediction,
‘‘based on current models’’, was ‘‘a likely increase in
global mean temperature of about 1 C above the present
value by 2025’’ (p. xii). Later (p. xxiv), IPCC said, as
shown in Fig. 8 on p. xxii of FAR, that the lower and upper
bounds of its predictions were, respectively, 30 % below
and 50 % above its best estimate. Accordingly, IPCC
predicted warming of 1.0 [0.7, 1.5] K to 2025. Since the
graph is close to linear from 1990 to 2025 and beyond,
little error arises by assuming linear warming over the
period, so that IPCC’s pro rata predicted warming interval
from 1990 to 2014 was 0.71 [0.49, 1.06] K. However,
observed warming over the quarter century from 1990 to
2014, taken as the linear trend on the RSS temperature
dataset [43], was 0.26 K. Therefore, IPCC’s central pre-
diction was more than 2.5 times observed outturn.
As for the simple model, taking the Planck sensitivity
parameter k0 = 0.31 K W
-1 m2 and the transience frac-
tion r25 = 1 (reflecting assumed net-negative feedback),
adopting the values in [6, table 7] for the feedback sum
f and the closed-loop gain g, and taking from FAR the CO2
forcing coefficient k = 6.3 and the CO2 fraction q = 0.7,
the simple model predicts warming of 0.27 [0.23, 0.37] K
since 1990, consistent with outturn (Table 1).
2.4.2 Observational tests 2–4
The simple model was also tested against IPCC’s estimates
of net anthropogenic radiative forcings of 0.57 W m-2
from 1750 to 1950, 1.25 W m-2 from 1750 to 1980 and
2.29 W m-2 from 1750 to 2012 (AR5, Fig. SPM.5), under
the assumptions that there was 0.1 K natural warming from
1750 to 1850, the year when HadCRUT4 [44] began (the
central England record shows 0.1 K warming from 1750 to
1850) and that all warming since 1850 was anthropogenic.
Under these assumptions, the simple model hindcasts
anthropogenic warming of 0.15 [0.12, 0.20] K against
Fig. 3 Probability densities based on four different aerosol reanal-
yses in [41], indicating climate sensitivity is most likely to fall in the
region of 1.3 K. Equilibrium climate sensitivity intervals in [6] and in
AR5 are indicated by dark and light shadings, respectively. Graph
based on [42]
Table 1 Comparison of the 1990–2014 climate-sensitivity interval in the simple model with outturn taken as the RSS [43] linear trend and the
intervals implicit in FAR on the business-as-usual emissions Scenario A, assuming that the proportionate change in CO2 concentration was
397/353 and that, as in FAR, the CO2 forcing coefficient k = 6.3 and the CO2 fraction q = 0.7
f g k? DF25 DT25
[6] [6] k0(1 - g)
-1 q-1 k ln 397/353 Model k? DF25 Obsv. [43] FAR Scn.A
(W m-2 K-1) (K W-1 m2) (W m-2) (K) (K) (K)
-1.60 -0.5 0.208 0.23 0.49
-0.64 -0.2 0.260 1.057 0.27 0.26 0.71
?0.32 ?0.1 0.347 0.37 1.06
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0.15 K observed from 1750 to 1950, 0.33 [0.26, 0.43] K
against 0.28 K observed from 1750 to 1980 and 0.60 [0.48,
0.80] K against 0.66 K observed from 1750 to 2012
(Table 2).
As in [37], no allowance was made in the four obser-
vational tests for the significant correlation between
regional rates of economic growth and of climate warming
in recent decades, suggesting that the urban heat-island
effect has not been purged from the temperature datasets
and may account for up to 0.2 K of the twentieth-century
warming [45], or for the upward adjustment of some 0.3 K
in recent observed terrestrial temperatures [46].
Results of all four tests against observation are sum-
marized in Fig. 4.
IPCC—on the advice of expert reviewers including the
lead author of the present paper—has realized that the
general-circulation models were exaggerating warming and
has substituted its ‘‘expert assessment’’ for the models’
predictions, greatly reducing its medium-term warming
projections in AR5 compared with FAR. In 1990, IPCC
predicted medium-term warming at 0.3 [0.2, 0.4] K
decade-1, near-halved in 2013, following observed
warming at 0.14 K decade-1 since 1990, to just 0.17 [0.10,
0.23] K decade-1. Curiously, though, IPCC has not cor-
respondingly reduced its equilibrium sensitivity interval
[1.5, 4, 5] K, identical to the interval given 36 years ago in
Jule Charney’s influential report [47] for the U.S. National
Academy of Sciences.
2.5 Further defects
In [37], it is argued that the interval of observations in [6],
i.e., [0.0, 1.1] K century-1, the lower bound representing
the RSS temperature change over the past 18 years
6 months, the upper bound representing the centennial
equivalent of the warming since 1950 shown in the Had-
CRUT4 dataset, ought not to have been projected out to
2050. However, little turns on this graphical projection,
which served merely to illustrate the very large divergence
between the outturn to date and the models’ predictions,
and to show how much wider that divergence will become
if, as the simple model predicts, it persists to 2050. In
particular, the statistical test that shows that the observed
warming during one period differed from that found in [6]
is likewise superfluous. The authors of [37] need have said
no more than they used values, time points and temperature
datasets that differed from those in [6].
The plots in Fig. 1 of [37] are not the result of out-of-
sample predictions, but comprise model fits to the observed
data. The plots are analogous to showing how close a
regression line is over a scatter plot of already-observed
data. All that these plots indicate is that over the chosen
period and using the chosen temperature datasets, the
CMIP5 outputs can be made to fit the data marginally
better than those of the simple model. However, as the
above four observational tests using both satellite and ter-
restrial datasets illustrate, the simple model outperforms
the general-circulation models over the period since 1990
and is very close to observation at all other timescales.
The real test of a model is always predictive skill. That a
model should fit observed data well is a necessary but not a
sufficient criterion for predictive skill. In [37], the fallacy is
perpetrated of assuming that better model fit implies better
predictive skill. It does not, as is amply demonstrated in
Figs. 6, 7, 8 and 9 here. Yet the observational tests
described above show that the simple model fits observed
data well. For the period since 1990, it outperforms the
general-circulation models by a substantial margin.
Furthermore, RMSE model-fit statistics are generally a
poor measure to use in validation because the in-sample
Table 2 Modeled and observed global mean anthropogenic surface temperature anomalies based on anthropogenic forcings in AR5 (SPM.5),
1750–1950, 1750–1980 and 1750–2012
Period k? DFanth DTanth
AR5 SPM.5 k0(1 - g)
-1 AR5 SPM.5 Model k? DFanth Obsv. [44]
(K W-1 m2) (W m-2) (K) (K)
1750–1950 0.208 0.12
0.260 0.57 0.15 0.15
0.347 0.20
0.208 0.26
1750–1980 0.260 1.25 0.33 0.28
0.347 0.43
0.208 0.48
1750–2012 0.260 2.29 0.60 0.66
0.347 0.80
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model predictions are not univariate numbers, but ‘‘en-
velopes’’ that should be (but in [37] were not) treated
probabilistically. A statistical technique such as the com-
plete-rank probability score is far superior [48].
It is concluded in [37] that the simple model ‘‘may not
be considered validated’’. Here, the elementary error is
made of assuming that a choice of parameter values that is
thought inappropriate invalidates the model to which that
choice of parameters was applied, rather than invalidating
solely the chosen parameter values. The simple model, if
informed with IPCC’s parameter values, generates climate
sensitivities very close to those put forward by IPCC, as the
authors of [37] themselves demonstrate, thereby—in their
own terms—validating it. The simple model, if informed
with the alternative parameter choices presented in [6],
generates hindcasts remarkably close to observation, pro-
viding further validation.
What is more, the fact that the simple model was
developed entirely from physical first principles and was
not adjusted by regression to make it fit past temperature
change is not a vice but a virtue. The fact that the model
performs as well as it does without any need for such ex
post facto adjustment is additional validation.
2.6 Closed-loop gain
In [37], an incomplete summary is given of the grounds in [6]
for considering it likely that the closed-loop feedback gain
factor g\ 0.1 (misdescribed in [37] as the ‘‘system gain’’,
which is the term usually applied—and applied in [6]—to the
open-loop gain factor G). In fact, there is now extensive
literature, some of it cited in [6], indicating on the basis of
empirical evidence as well as theory that temperature feed-
backs are not likely to be strongly net positive.
The parameters in [6] were chosen on the basis of the
literature cited and on the basis of the inapplicability of the
Bode system-gain equation to strongly net-positive feed-
backs in the climate object. In [49], the relative charac-
teristics of net-positive and net-negative feedbacks are
described. The characteristics of the net-positive feedbacks
are inconsistent with the thermostatic behavior of the cli-
mate, while those of net-negative feedback are consistent
with it. In [50], it is demonstrated that climate feedbacks
correspond neither to the concept of feedback used in
control theory nor ‘‘in any literal sense to the concept of
feedback as used in electronics … the figurative transfer of
an amplification formula from another field into the climate
area must not be seen as implying that some general
physical principle is being invoked’’. Yet IPCC (e.g., AR4,
p. 631 fn.) uses the Bode system-gain relation without
appropriate cautions as to its inapplicability where strongly
net-positive feedbacks are posited. The authors of [37] are,
of course, as free as anyone else to choose their own
parameter values.
2.7 Determination of the feedback sum from
paleoclimate evidence
The authors of [37] cite [51] as contradicting the assertion
in [6], following the cryostratigraphic temperature recon-
struction in [52], that paleoclimate temperature varied by
only 3.5 K either side of the mean over the past 810 ka.
They say Zachos et al. [51] found that during the late
Paleocene thermal maximum 55 Ma B.P. temperatures in
high latitudes rose by 8 K, perhaps as a result of forcing
from greenhouse-gas increases.
However, with respect, 810 ka is not the same interval
as 55 Ma. Over the 54 Ma from the Paleocene–Eocene
thermal maximum to the commencement of the currently
available cryostratigraphic temperature reconstruction,
there were substantial and very significant changes in tec-
tonic and continental configurations inconsistent in funda-
mental respects with today’s climatic environment.
Furthermore, the quotation from [51] given in [37] is
incomplete: The words ‘‘and lesser amounts toward the
equator’’ were omitted. Here, an error is made that is
common among those unfamiliar with the consequences of
poleward advection, one of the many fundamental and
often underappreciated non-radiative transfers in the cli-
mate object [53, 54]. Cryostratigraphy reconstructs polar
temperatures; but advection from the tropics approximately
doubles at the poles any change in mean global tempera-
tures. By this polar amplification, the 7 K global glacial-to-
interglacial interval of temperature change shown in [52] is
equivalent to 14 K at the poles.
The 8 K polar change even during the extreme and rapid
events of the late Paleocene thermal maximum is thus well
Fig. 4 Four tests of the simple model’s hindcasts (solid-edged boxes
central values in white) against observed global mean temperature
anomalies from 1990 to 2015 (arrowed C) and against (1) FAR’s
near-term predictions (dashed edges) based on 1.00 [0.70, 1.50] K
warming to 2025 and using AR5’s estimates of total anthropogenic
forcings from 1750 to (2) 1950; (3) 1980 and (4) 2012. The observed
HadCRUT4 [44] surface temperature anomalies (1) and RSS [43]
satellite temperature anomalies (2–4) always fall on the simple
model’s hindcast intervals (left); however, FAR’s near-term predic-
tions (right) have proven to be much in excess of observation
Sci. Bull. (2015) 60(15):1378–1390 1383
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within the interval implicit in the cryostratigraphic record
presented by [52]. Furthermore, in [51] it is made quite
plain that the cause of that thermal maximum, whose onset
may have occurred over as little as 1,000 years, is
unknown. It is not thought that CO2 had anything to do
with it, though [51] canvasses the possibility of a sub-
stantial dissociation and subsequent oxidation of
2000–2600 Gt of CH4 from abyssal clathrates.
In [37], it is also stated that, if temperature feedbacks
were negative, small initial forcings owing to the Milan-
kovitch cycles would not be capable of triggering glacial–
interglacial transitions. Yet two suggested possible causes
of the late Paleocene thermal maximum, discussed in [51],
are the large forcings from abrupt deep-sea warming
resulting from sudden changes in ocean circulation [55, 56]
and massive regional slope failure [57].
2.8 Ocean heat content
In [37], it is asserted that the ARGO bathythermograph
buoys found a ‘‘net heating’’ of about 0.5 W m-2 from
2000 to 2010. In fact, [58], cited in [37], inferred the
energy imbalance from satellite observations and used
ARGO measurements to determine whether there was an
inconsistency between the indications from the two sys-
tems. Over the 11 full years of available data, the ARGO
buoys show warming at a rate equivalent to only 0.023 K
decade-1 (Fig. 5). The buoys did not begin supplying
global data till 2004, so that they did not cover the first four
of the 11 years mentioned in [37].
The ARGO data (albeit subject to substantial coverage
uncertainties in that each buoy must attempt to represent
the temperature changes in 200,000 km3 of ocean) indeed
demonstrate warming of the ocean over the 11-year period
for which data are available. There are also measurement
uncertainties: Sampling errors of up to 2 K were reported
in [59]. Warming trend over the decade was 0.02 K. If this
trend were the consequence of 0.5 W m-2 of radiative
forcing, then the implicit transient-sensitivity parameter
would be 0.04 K W m-2 compared with the zero-feedback
value 0.31 W m-2. Even after allowing for thermal inertia
in the oceans, the implication is that strongly net-negative
temperature feedbacks are in operation, confirming, con-
trary to an assertion in [37], that little error arises from
assuming rt = 1.
2.9 Values of the transience fraction rt
In [37], it is argued that the choice of rt = 1 in [6] was
‘‘equivalent to an instantaneous response’’, but that ‘‘this is
only true if the heat capacity of Earth is zero’’. Here, the
authors of [37] have misunderstood the definition of the
transience fraction. In [6], the transience fraction was
defined as ‘‘the fraction of equilibrium sensitivity expected
to be attained over t years,’’ but, in the discussion of this
variable, it was made plain that its purpose was to allow for
nonlinearities specifically arising from the action of tem-
perature feedbacks over different timescales. Thus, where
feedbacks are net zero, the instantaneous and equilibrium
sensitivity parameters are equal and the transience fraction
is accordingly unity. It may, however, be set to any desired
lesser value to simulate response lags caused by thermal
inertia.
2.10 Reasons why the general-circulation models’
predictions have proven excessive
In [37], it is stated that ‘‘temperature trends since
approximately 1998 have been at the low end of the
CMIP5 distribution’’. In fact, it is not appropriate to
consider only the period since 1998, for nearly all of that
period falls within the current negative phase of the
Pacific Decadal Oscillation [60], whose 30-year cycles of
positive or warming phases followed by 30-year cycles of
cooling phases have had a visible effect on the evolution
of global temperature since the beginning of the twentieth
century. These cycles must be allowed for in attribution of
temperature trends. The simplest method is to ensure that
any period of study is either a multiple of 60 years or, if
less than 60 years, is centered on a phase transition
between the PDO phases. Conveniently, IPCC made its
first temperature predictions in 1990 and almost half of
the period since then was in a positive PDO phase, the
remainder being in a negative phase. As Fig. 1 of [6]
demonstrated, IPCC’s central medium-term global-warm-
ing prediction in 1990 has proven to be double the
observed warming rate, which falls below IPCC’s entire
predicted warming interval.
Fig. 5 Ocean temperature, 0–1,900 m depth, 70N–70S, over the
entire ARGO time series from 2004 to 2014. Since the ARGO buoys
measure temperature, the ARGO data from 2004 to 2014 were
obtained from the ARGO marine atlas and are shown together with
the linear trend
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A measure of the severity of the models’ failure is
shown in Fig. 6, where all linear trends on the influential
tropical mid-troposphere temperatures predicted by 73
models exceed those on two global-temperature datasets.
Likewise, RSS [43] indicates a considerable exaggera-
tion of the warming rate by the models (Fig. 7).
It is recognized in [37] that the general-circulation models
have failed in the task of predicting global-temperature
change. Indeed, three possible explanations are offered:
overestimated radiative forcing, inadequate representation
of internal variability and overestimated climate response. It
is suggested that the authors of [6] favor the third explanation
of the models’ running hot. However, the state of knowledge
of the magnitude of radiative forcings and of the mechanisms
of internal climate variability is insufficient to allow any
definite conclusion to be drawn. As an instance, the startling
abruptness and magnitude of the Great El Nin˜o of 1997–1998
(Fig. 8) and its two predecessors over the past 300 years are
not yet satisfactorily explained. Accordingly, [6] concen-
trated on five specific aspects of the models’ representation
of climate that were likely to have contributed significantly
to the considerable overstatements of warming in the mod-
els’ projections.
The second satellite dataset, UAH, shows a similar
period of temperature stasis. None of the complex models
predicted anything like so long a hiatus in global warming.
The discrepancy between prediction and observation over
that 18-year period is smaller for the simple model than for
the general-circulation models.
2.11 IPCC’s estimates of temperature feedbacks
It is argued in [37] that [6] had misinterpreted IPCC
feedback estimates, in that the magnitudes of the principal
climate-related feedbacks had been determined by different
methods in AR4 and AR5, the latter having included rep-
resentations of ocean changes and also having assumed a
linear feedback response, and in that a second panel in
Fig. 9.43 of AR5 had not been reproduced alongside the
first.
Here, the authors of [37] are more than somewhat
disingenuous. Figure 9.43 of AR5 was stated and intended
to provide a direct comparison between the magnitudes of
Fig. 6 Linear trends on tropical mid-troposphere temperature anomalies projected by 73 models and measured by two coincident observational
datasets [61, 62] 1979–2012
Fig. 7 Mean RSS [43] lower-troposphere temperature anomalies,
80S–80N, 1979–2014 (black spline-curve) against anomalies pre-
dicted by 33 models. Based on a graph by C. Mears [44]
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temperature feedbacks in AR4 and AR5. The feedback sum
in AR5 is substantially less than that in AR4, because the
more complete representation of the coupled ocean-atmo-
sphere system in AR5 has constrained the feedback values
(which, however, remain substantially overstated). Fur-
thermore, the second panel of Fig. 9.43 was omitted in [6]
because it did not concern itself with individual feedback
values; nor did it compare the feedback sums in AR4 and
AR5.
For the reasons explained in [6], the feedback values in
AR4 lead to the climate sensitivities found in AR4, but the
same is not the case for AR5, where equilibrium sensitivity
should have been—but was not—reduced by one-third to
take account of the reduction in feedback values. Contrary
to an assertion in [37], neither the text of AR5 nor the
missing panel from Fig. 9.43 in any way explains the
reasons why a substantial reduction in feedback values in
response to an unchanged forcing might somehow lead to
an unchanged climate sensitivity.
As for the fact that AR5 assumed a linear feedback
response, the implications of this assumption for climate
sensitivity are by no means clear, not least because the values
of individual feedbacks, as well as the curves of their evo-
lution over time, are so uncertain. The Appendix to [6],
which was lost for reasons of space, is annexed here to out-
line the mathematical treatment of nonlinear feedbacks.
3 Discussion
In [6], the simple model that provided a framework by
which some of the assumptions and methods in the general-
circulation models could be tested, and five defects in those
models were identified and discussed. In [37], three of the
five principal findings in [6] were challenged, but, for the
reasons described above, the challenges were not com-
pelling. Two of the five conclusions in [6] were not chal-
lenged in [37]: that there is no global warming ‘‘in the
pipeline’’ in consequence of our past emissions and that the
extreme RCP 8.5 scenario is unjustifiable.
In [37], an attempt was made to demonstrate that the
predictive skill of the simple model presented in [6] was
worse than that of the general-circulation models. How-
ever, that attempt merely served to confirm the skill of the
simple model in replicating IPCC’s climate sensitivities if
IPCC’s values for the model’s parameters were adopted.
And tests of the model against observed temperature
change show that since 1750 the simple model performs
much as the general-circulation models perform and since
1990 the model has performed with very much greater skill
than the general-circulation models.
Very nearly all of the attempted criticisms of [6], though
presented as criticisms of the simple model, were in fact
directed solely at the choice of parameter values, and not of
the simple model itself, which the authors of [37] inad-
vertently validated in accordance with their own method-
ology by adopting parameter values consistent with IPCC
reports and consequently obtaining IPCC estimates of cli-
mate sensitivity from the simple model.
One point that emerges from comparison of the relative
merits and skills of the simple and general-circulation
models is the sheer magnitude of the influence of uncer-
tainty on any attempt to project future climate states.
IPCC, to its credit, has consistently conceded that
Fig. 8 RSS [43] monthly global mean lower-troposphere temperature anomalies, January 1997 to June 2015. Over these 18 years 6 months, the
linear trend on the anomalies is approximately zero, notwithstanding CO2 concentration rising at a rate equivalent to[200 lmol mol
-1 cen-
tury-1. One-third of all anthropogenic emissions since 1750 arose in these 222 months
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uncertainties in cloud and aerosol forcings and feedbacks
are substantial. The recent reevaluation of the impact of
anthropogenic aerosols on the determination of climate
sensitivity in [41] is a case in point. FAR had made little
allowance for aerosols. Subsequent IPCC Assessment
Reports made so much allowance for them that forcings
since the industrial revolution were all but halved. This
decision had the effect of greatly increasing estimates of
climate sensitivity derived from observation of tempera-
ture change since 1750. If [41] is correct, however (the
literature is strongly divided on the aerosol question), then
perhaps FAR was right all along about the magnitude of
post-1750 forcings.
IPCC has also recognized, correctly, that the climate
behaves as a coupled, nonlinear, chaotic object and that,
accordingly, the long-term prediction of future climate
states is not possible [TAR, §14.2.2.2; cf. 63, 64].
The greatest source of uncertainty in determining cli-
mate sensitivity lies in the temperature feedbacks. That
feedbacks exist is self-evident. However, their magnitudes
and even in some instances their signs are unknown. Here,
IPCC and the general-circulation models are at fault in
assuming that the magnitudes of most temperature feed-
backs are well constrained. Plainly, this is not the case, as
the reduction in the feedback sum f from 2.0 W m-2 K-1 in
AR4 to 1.5 in AR5 demonstrates. For the reasons discussed
in [6], it is likely that the feedback sum is net negative,
whereupon climate sensitivity cannot exceed an upper
bound of 1.3 K per CO2 doubling.
The atmosphere, sandwiched between two vast heat
sinks, the ocean below and outer space above, has proven
unsurprisingly thermostatic during the stable geological
conditions of the past 810,000 years [52]. One might only
maintain that climate sensitivity was high by asserting—
incorrectly, and counter to evidence in [51, 53, 54]—that
no large forcings occurred in the later Pleistocene and
Holocene and that, therefore, the small temperature change
in the past 810,000 years was attributable to large feed-
backs operating on small forcings.
Finally, though it is falsely claimed in [37] that in [6] the
cited references [16, 19] have been ‘‘collectively rebutted’’,
no specific arguments or references were provided. Such
references, in fact, have not been rebutted but rather have
become accepted by mainstream science. For example, at
least two recent publications [65, 66] suggest findings
consistent with the infrared iris hypothesis advanced in
[67] by the lead author of [16].
4 Conclusions
The general-circulation models now face a crisis of credi-
bility. Not one of them predicted a stasis of as long as
18 years 6 months (Fig. 8) in global temperatures. Indeed,
it is often stated that periods C15 years without warming
are inconsistent with models’ predictions. For instance,
[68, 69] state: ‘‘The simulations rule out (at the 95 % level)
zero trends for intervals of 15 year or more, suggesting that
an observed absence of warming of this duration is needed
to create a discrepancy with the expected present-day
warming rate’’. See also [70–72].
The models relied upon in FAR predicted twice as much
warming from 1990 to 2014 as has been observed. All
models predicted a warming rate in the crucial tropical
mid-troposphere considerably in excess of observation. It is
no longer credible to ignore these ever-widening
Fig. 9 Medium-term AR5 warming projections (gray region) against the RSS [43] monthly global mean lower-troposphere temperature
anomalies, January 2005–June 2015, and the trend thereon
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discrepancies between prediction and observation. IPCC
itself has recognized that, at least as far as medium-term
prediction is concerned, the models have failed, raising the
legitimate question whether the longer-term predictions
may also have been exaggerated, perhaps as greatly as the
medium-term predictions.
The best estimate in FAR was that in the 35 years
1990–2025 global temperature would rise at an approxi-
mately linear rate by 1.0 K. After 25 of those 35 years,
RSS data show just 0.27 K global warming has occurred—
a rate equivalent to just 0.11 K decade-1. To reach 1.0 K
in the next 10 years, the warming rate would have to
accelerate to 0.74 K decade-1, or almost seven times the
rate observed over the past 25 years. Recently, [72] drew
attention to the fact that internal variability may play an
important role in explaining the apparent near-zero trend in
September Arctic sea-ice extent record from 2007 to 2013.
IPCC, unlike the authors of [37], has taken note of the
failure of the general-circulation models’ predictions and
has not sought to maintain that they were accurate when
they were not. Figure 9 shows how strongly excessive
AR4’s predictions remain. In AR5, IPCC cut its central
prediction of medium-term warming from 0.29 to 0.17 K
decade-1, still well above the observed rate of 0.11 K
decade-1 over the past 25 years.
Over the past decade, the overprediction even on the
new, very much lower rate of predicted medium-term
warming has proven to be 0.14 K. The measured atmo-
spheric warming over the period was equivalent to 0.25 K
century-1, consistent with the underlying ocean warming
rate of 0.23 K century-1 shown in the ARGO monthly
anomalies over a very similar period (Fig. 5).
In the circumstances, it cannot be safely said that, at
least as to transient climate sensitivity, the general-circu-
lation models are better validated than the simple model.
See [73–75] for a fuller discussion of model validation,
which is a more complex task than simply the analysis of
RMSE and bias mentioned in [73].
The value of the simple model, particularly when
informed by parameters arguably more reasonable than
those adopted by the IPCC, is in facilitating examination of
the reasons why extreme overpredictions are being made—
predictions that governments are acting upon.
As to whether the predictions of general-circulation
models or of the simple model will prove correct in the
long run, only time will tell. For recent decades, though,
the simple model is proving closer to reality.
The pressing question arises why the general-circulation
models’ central longer-term projections suggest as much as
3 K warming by 2100 compared with today, let alone why
still more extreme estimates of up to 6 K twenty-first-cen-
tury warming are still made in some circles. The simple
model suggests high sensitivity is implausible.
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